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I. INTRODUCTION
Queen: This is no ordinary apple. It's a magic wishing apple.
Snow White: A wishing apple?
Queen: Yes. One bite, and all your dreams will come true.
Snow White: Really?
Queen: Yes, girlie. Now, make a wish, and take a bite.'
Unfortunately for Snow White, one bite led to an impending sleep-
ing death, only to be saved by a kiss from her true love, the Prince.2 This
famous fairy tale can be analogized to the pleading stage in securities
fraud litigation.3 Just as Snow White hoped that one bite from the magic
wishing apple would eventually make all her dreams come true, plain-
tiffs hope that their complaint against a defendant for alleged securities
fraud will survive the pleading stage and continue to discovery. Further,
just as one bite can lead to a sleeping death only to be saved by true
love's kiss, a complaint can lead to a dismissal only to be saved by a
leave to amend4 allowed by the court.
This analogy holds true in many federal circuits.' However, in the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the analogy fails because there is no
Prince to save Snow White; plaintiffs are not allowed to amend their
original complaint, as they are dismissed with prejudice when they do
not meet the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's ("PSLRA")6
heightened pleading standards.' In Cole v. Harris, over 200 plaintiffs
alleged various claims of securities fraud based on an alleged Ponzi
scheme by the defendants.8 A magistrate judge dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaint with prejudice for failing to plead fraud with particularity as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the PSLRA.9 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed "for the reasons stated in the magistrate judge's
1. SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DwARs (Walt Disney Productions 1937).
2. Id.
3. Securities fraud is governed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which Congress
enacted to provide laws for regulating the various securities exchange marketplaces and to
authorize the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). See Brian S.
Sommer, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence: Improving Balance in the Private Securities
Litigation Arena with a Screening Panel Approach, 44 WASHBuRN L.J. 413, 418-19 (2005).
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 forbids the "use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security . . . [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (2012).
4. See discussion infra Part I.B.
5. See discussion infra Part III.B.i-iv.
6. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
7. See discussion infra Part IH.A, IV.
8. See 444 F. App'x 888 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 126 (2012).
9. Id.
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Memorandum Opinion and Orders," stating in addition that the relevant
case law "support[s] the denial of the motion to amend . . . ."'o Plaintiffs
filed a writ of certiorari, which was denied by the Supreme Court of the
United States."
This Article argues that the Supreme Court erred in not granting
certiorari, as the circuit split on this issue of amendments to complaints
in securities fraud litigation needs resolution. Part H summarizes the
rules that govern pleadings and amendments in securities fraud litiga-
tion: the PSLRA and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Part III
discusses current jurisprudence regarding whether amendments are
allowed in this area of law, focusing on recent case law in the Sixth
Circuit and the existing circuit split. Part IV examines the Sixth Circuit
case of Cole v. Harris, summarizing the factual background, procedural
history, and ruling in the case. Part V proffers that the Supreme Court
should have granted certiorari in Cole and should have reversed the
decision for various inconsistencies that the current rule creates. Finally,
Part VI concludes by arguing that the Supreme Court should have
reversed the rule in Cole and should have instead altered the rule so that
plaintiffs bringing federal securities fraud claims may be allowed to
freely amend when these claims are dismissed for not complying with
the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA, as is required by Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).
II. WHAT RULES GOVERN PLEADING AND AMENDMENTS IN
SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION?
A. Private Security Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA")
Congress enacted the PSLRA in December of 1995 to address
problems plaguing securities class action litigation.' 2 According to Con-
gress, "[t]he private securities litigation system is too important to the
integrity of the American capital markets to allow this system to be
undermined by those who seek to line their own pockets by bringing
abusive and meritless suits."l 3 Congress heard substantial testimony that
lawyers were filing frivolous "strike" suits alleging violations of the fed-
eral securities laws in the hope that defendants will quickly settle to
avoid the expense of litigation.' 4 Congress intended the PSLRA "(1) to
encourage the voluntary disclosure of information by corporate issuers;
10. Id. at 889.
11. Cole, 133 S. Ct. at 126.
12. Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes
During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489 (2006).
13. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
14. See S. REP. No.104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
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(2) to empower investors so that they-not their lawyers-exercise pri-
mary control over private securities litigation; and (3) to encourage
plaintiffs' lawyers to pursue valid claims and defendants to fight abusive
claims."" Congress enacted many reforms and raised the substantive bar
as to the elements that must be proved to recover on the basis of securi-
ties fraud in order to discourage and eliminate meritless suits, which
include an alteration to the pleading,16 discovery, scienter, causation,
and damages for cases brought under the federal securities laws.' 7
With regard to a heightened pleading standard, Congress heard tes-
timony "on the need to establish uniform and more stringent pleading
requirements to curtail the filing of meritless lawsuits."" In 2007, the
Supreme Court reiterated that "[s]etting a uniform pleading standard for
§ 10(b) actions was among Congress' objectives when it enacted the
PSLRA." 19 The Supreme Court also recognized the PSLRA's twin
goals: (1) "curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation," (2) "while preserv-
ing investors' ability to recover on meritorious claims." 2 0 The question
of whether the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15(a) still applies under
the heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA was not before the
Court in Tellabs, but the decision left room for debate and interpretation
after the Court's ruling.2'
15. Id.
16. See generally Brian E. Casey, David C. Mahaffey & John F. Olson, Pleading Reform,
Plaintiff Qualification and Discovery Stays Under the Reform Act, 51 Bus. LAW. 1101, 1115-
1135 (1996) (discussing the pleading requirements of the PSLRA).
17. See John M. Wunderlich, Amending Pleadings in Securities Fraud Litigation After
Tellabs, 37 SEC. REG. L.J. 361, 363 (2009); see also Choi & Thompson, supra note 12, at 1493.
18. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41.
19. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007). Although the
Court was dealing with the PSLRA's "strong inference of scienter" standard, its lengthy
discussion about the interaction between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the PSLRA is
helpful to understanding the interplay between Rule 15 and the PSLRA. See Wunderlich, supra
note 17, at 366-70; see also infra Part V.C; accord ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512
F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding "that under the reasoning of Tellabs, the PSLRA does not
alter the liberal amendment policy of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15"). However, some courts
have decided the amendment issue of Rule 15 and the PSLRA without relying on or mentioning
the Court's language in Tellabs. See, e.g., Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1235
(11th Cir. 2008) ("Since '[t]he text of the [PSLRA] neither purports to affect Rule 15(a),
nor ... require[s] that all dismissals be with prejudice,' the normal Rule 15(a) standards apply.");
Galvin v. McCarthy, 545 F. Supp. 2d, 1176, 1187 (D. Colo. 2008) (denying plaintiff's request for
leave to amend because "caselaw [sic] suggests that leave to amend should not be so freely given
under the [PSLRA]").
20. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322.
21. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 507, 526 (2009); cf
supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussion of relevant case law dealing with amendment
issue after Tellabs).
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B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs amended and supple-
mental pleadings.2 2 For pre-trial amendments, Rule 15(a) allows for an
amendment "as a matter of course" if it is made "within 21 days after
serving [the pleading]." 23 If not made within 21 days, then "a party may
amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the
court's leave." 24 However, the rule makes clear that the "court should
freely give leave when justice so requires."25
The Supreme Court has stated that the mandate of "when justice so
requires" is "to be heeded."2 6 "If the underlying facts or circumstances
relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to
be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits."2 7 The Court
further stated:
[T]he grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discre-
tion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave with-
out any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of
discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with
the spirit of the Federal Rules.2 8
This "spirit" with regards to Rule 15 and a court granting leave to amend
can best be described as a liberal policy. 29 However, the right to amend
is not absolute.3 0 A court may deny a party leave to amend only if there
is undue delay caused by the moving party, bad faith caused by the mov-
ing party, or prejudice to the opposing party." The Supreme Court has
described in more detail when an amendment may not be allowed:
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as
22. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).
25. Id.
26. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See F.D.I.C. v. Bates, 42 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging "the liberal
position of the federal rules on granting amendments"); accord Carrol v. Fort James Corp., 470
F.3d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 2006) ("The policy of the Federal Rules is to permit liberal
amendment."); Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Fed.R.Civ.P. 15
embodies the liberal pleading philosophy of the federal rules."); C.I.R. v. Finley, 265 F.2d 885,
888 (10th Cir. 1959) ("In the interest of justice, the trend of court decisions is for a liberal
construction of rules authorizing the amendment of pleadings.").
30. Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835, 841 (8th Cir. 2004).
31. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.
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the rules require, be "freely given." 32
Overall, Rule 15's liberal amendment policy "limits the district court's
discretion to deny leave to amend.""
III. DOES THE PSLRA RESTRICT THE LIBERAL AMENDMENT POLICY
EMBODIED IN RULE 15(a)?
Nowhere in the text of the PSLRA is there any mention of Rule
15(a). Nevertheless, there is ample case law on the issue of whether the
PSLRA restricts Rule 15(a) and its liberal amendment policy." Because
there is disagreement among the federal circuits, this section will
examine the current jurisprudence in certain circuits.
A. Current Sixth Circuit Jurisprudence
The Sixth Circuit is one of two circuits that have held that the
PSLRA restricts the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15(a).3 5 Before
Cole, the Sixth Circuit had dealt with this amendment issue multiple
times. 6 However, its current interpretation of the issue was first estab-
lished in Miller v. Champion Enterprises Inc."
In Miller, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
both to dismiss a complaint that did not meet the heightened pleading
standards of the PSLRA and to deny leave to file a proposed amended
complaint.38 A shareholder sued a corporation and its Chief Executive
Officer under, inter alia, various sections of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, alleging that the defendants "made various false or misleading
statements related to the bankruptcy of its largest customer." 39 When the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, the plaintiff filed a
32. Id.
33. Adams, 739 F.2d at 864. Additionally, Rule 15 reflects two of the most important policies
of the federal rules: (1) courts should provide a maximum opportunity for each claim to be
decided on its merits rather than procedural technicalities; and (2) the federal rules assign
pleadings the limited role of providing the parties with notice. See Wunderlich, supra note 17, at
362; see also 6 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & RICHARD L.
MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1471 (3d ed. 2012).
34. See discussion infra Part II.A-B, IV.
35. The Third Circuit is the only other federal circuit that agrees with the Sixth Circuit. See,
e.g., In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002) (adopting the conclusion
"that the PSLRA limits the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 in securities fraud
cases").
36. See Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 236 (6th Cir. 2004); Stambaugh v. Corrpro Cos., Inc.,
116 F. App'x 592, 598 (6th Cir. 2004); PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671 (6th Cir.
2004).
37. See 346 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2003).
38. See id. at 666.
39. Id.
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motion for leave to file an amended complaint.4 0 Although the Sixth
Circuit found that the complaint pled scienter with sufficient particular-
ity, it held that the complaint "did not contain allegations sufficient to
state a claim under the heightened pleading requirements of the
PSLRA." 4 1
The Sixth Circuit held that the district court "did not err in denying
plaintiff's motion for leave to file the [amended complaint]."42 The court
made this ruling despite prior case law stating that "[i]n the securities
litigation context, leave to amend is particularly appropriate where the
complaint does not allege fraud with particularity." 43 The court based its
holding on two grounds: (1) "the amendments provided in the [amended
complaint] were futile"44 and (2) "allowing the repeated filing of
amended complaints would frustrate the purpose of the PSLRA."'I
Much of the district court's reasoning was incorporated by the Sixth
Circuit, as it concluded that the PSLRA "could not achieve [its] purpose
if plaintiffs were allowed to amend and amend until they got it right."4 6
In fact, the Sixth Circuit quoted some of the district court's language:
In this case, it appears that plaintiffs are contending that since discov-
ery procedures are not available to them, that a court must be lenient
in allowing amendments to pleadings. Contending that Rule 15 per-
mits this, they purposely seek to circumvent the [PSLRA's] strict
requirements preventing discovery. But this is precisely the device
that Congress intended to be used, i.e., to prevent suits in which a
foundation for the suit cannot be pleaded.
The stay of discovery and the heightened pleading standards are
separate and distinct, yet complimentary mechanisms. The stay of
discovery operates to prevent plaintiffs with baseless claims from
squeezing a nuisance settlement from an innocent defendant. The
pleading requirement is more than simply a line the plaintiffs must
cross to get to discovery; it is the heart of the [PSLRA]. This strin-
gent requirement operates to discourage baseless suits altogether. It
evinces Congress's acknowledgment of the burden an allegation of
40. See id. at 669.
41. Id. at 673-76. The court looked primarily at six separate communications that plaintiff
contended were false or misleading, finding that "[s]ome of [the] communications fall within the
safe harbor for 'forward-looking statements' provided by the PSLRA, while the others do not give
rise to a strong inference that [defendants] acted with sufficient scienter to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion dismiss under the heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA." Id. at 676.
42. See id. at 689.
43. Morse v. McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795, 800 (6th Cir. 2002).
44. Futility of amendment is an acceptable justification for denying leave to amend. Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). However, many times complaints are dismissed solely for the
fact that they do not meet the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA. See discussion infra
Part V.
45. Miller, 346 F.3d at 689.
46. Id. at 690.
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securities fraud places on the innocent defendant even without dis-
covery. The [PSLRA] requires a uniform pleading standard; this stan-
dard is meaningless if judges on a case-by-case basis grant leave to
amend numerous times.47
Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit relied on almost identical reasoning used
by the Third Circuit on the same issue.4 8 Part of that reasoning detailed
that "the stay of discovery procedures adopted in conjunction with the
heightened pleading standards under the PSLRA is a reflection of the
objective of Congress 'to provide a filter at the earliest stage (the plead-
ing stage) to screen out lawsuits that have no factual basis.'"9
B. Circuit Split
The blanket rule articulated by the Third and Sixth Circuits-that
complaints should be dismissed with prejudice if they do not meet the
heightened pleading standards required by the PSLRA-has not been
adopted as the universal rule across all the federal circuits. Four other
circuits have adopted the opposite rule in four relevant decisions: Emi-
nence Capital v. Aspeon, Inc.,"o Belizan v. Hershon," ACA Financial
Guaranty Corp. v. Advest, Inc.,52 and Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc.53
This circuit split is one of the main reasons why the Supreme Court
erred and should have granted certiorari in Cole.54
i. NINTH CIRCUIT: EMINENCE CAPITAL v. ASPEON, INC.
In Eminence Capital, the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of
the district court that dismissed the first amended consolidated com-
plaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim." This was a class action
securities fraud case, in which investors alleged various violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5.56 Plaintiffs alleged
that they were misled into believing that the defendants' "profitability
and financial prospects" were doing quite well when, in actuality, the
defendants recorded an income loss of 21%.51 These losses led to a
47. Id. at 691.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 691-92 (quoting In re NAHC, Inc. Secs. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1332-33 (3d Cir.
2002)).
50. 316 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
51. 434 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
52. 512 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2008).
53. 544 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2008).
54. See discussion infra Part V.
55. 316 F.3d at 1049 ("Because the district court failed to provide sufficient reasons to
overcome the presumption in favor of granting leave to amend, we reverse the judgment.").
56. Id. at 1050-51.
57. See id. at 1050.
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decline of income available to shareholders and a drastic drop in the
defendants' stock price." Eight other isolated shareholder suits were
filed against the defendant, resulting in a consolidation of the cases.5 9
Eventually, the district court dismissed the first amended consolidated
complaint with prejudice, reasoning that "[p]laintiffs have had three
'bites at the apple'6 0 and defend the dismissal without prejudice only on
grounds that the special committee will release a report that will provide
all the requisite details [required to plead a case under PSLRA]."61
This judgment disintegrated on appeal as the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the principles 62 embodied in freely allowing leave
to amend are "especially important in the context of the PSLRA." 63 The
court explained how the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA
are not easy to comply with.' The PSLRA requires a plaintiff to plead a
claim of securities fraud with an unprecedented degree of specificity and
detail, "giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate recklessness."6
Because of these difficult standards, the court concluded that there is no
"bright-line rule" with regards to pleading requirements of the PSLRA,
and it logically follows that plaintiffs should be freely allowed to amend
58. Id. The net income available to shareholders was only $1,717.00. Id. The stock price fell
to $1.50 per share in October, after being $30 per share in January. Id.
59. Id. at 1051.
60. This is not the first instance the "apple" analogy has been used in this article. See supra
text accompanying notes 1-2. Nor will it be the last. See infra Part V. However, it is important to
recognize the dangers of using such an analogy. See Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1053-54
(Reinhardt, J., concurring). Judge Reinhardt wrote separately to express his concern "regarding
the use of clich6s in judicial opinions, a technique that aids neither litigants nor judges, and fails to
advance our understanding of the law." Id. at 1053. He continued:
The per curiam opinion regrettably (but deliberately) reiterates the same cliche used
by the district court. Metaphors enrich writing only to the extent that they add
something to more pedestrian descriptions. Cliches do the opposite; they deaden our
senses to the nuances of language so often critical to our common law tradition. The
interpretation and application of statutes, rules, and case law frequently depends on
whether we can discriminate among subtle differences of meaning. The biting of
apples does not help us.
Id. at 1054.
61. Id. at 1053.
62. In its per curiam opinion, the Ninth Circuit discussed at length these principles. See id. at
1051-52. The court emphasized that the policy behind Rule 15(a) should be "applied with
extreme liberality." Id. at 1051 (quoting Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d
1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted)). It also listed the factors laid out in
Foman v. Davis, acknowledging that potential prejudice on the opposing party carries greater
weight than the other factors. See id. at 1052 ("Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the
remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave
to amend.").
63. Id. at 1052.
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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consistent with Rule 15(a).6 6 Unless it is clear that the complaint could
not be saved and amendment would be futile, dismissal with prejudice
and without leave to amend is inappropriate.6" The decision was subse-
quently reversed and remanded back to the district court.68
ii. D.C. CIRCUIT: BELIZAN V. HERSHON
After the Ninth Circuit's decision in Eminence Capital, other cir-
cuit courts of appeal began tackling the amendment in securities fraud
cases with a similar approach. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia confronted the issue in Belizan v. Hershon.69 There,
debt securities purchasers "filed securities fraud suits against the invest-
ment fund owner, its independent auditor, and seller."70 Plaintiffs
alleged that they purchased debt securities from defendants and were
victims "of a 'Ponzi scheme,' wherein proceeds from successive securi-
ties offerings were used to make interest payments to those who had
invested in prior offerings."" After all of the investors' suits were con-
solidated, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
denied plaintiffs' "oral motion to amend complaint, and dismissed com-
plaint72 with prejudice."73 The district court explained that counsel's ref-
erences to the possibility of amending the complaint did not "amount to
formal motions for leave to amend" and that, even if they did, the
PSLRA "counsel[s] restraint in granting leave to amend."74 As for the
dismissal being with prejudice, the court cited In re Champion Enter-
prises Inc. Securities Litigation, for the proposition that "the
[PSLRA] ... set[s] a high standard of pleading which if not met results
in a mandatory dismissal . .. with prejudice." 6
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 1053. With respect to the specific facts of the case, the court concluded that
"plaintiffs' allegations were not frivolous, plaintiffs were endeavoring in good faith to meet the
heightened pleading requirements and to comply with court guidance, and, most importantly, it
appears that plaintiffs had a reasonable chance of successfully stating a claim if given another
opportunity." Id.
69. 434 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
70. Id.
71. See id. at 580.
72. With respect to the alleged violations of section 10 and Rule 1Ob-5, the district court held
plaintiffs "had failed adequately to: (1) plead scienter; (2) allege claims with the specificity
required by Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA; and (3) plead causation." Id. at 581. The district court also
held that plaintiffs "failed properly to plead a violation of section 11, her claim under section
12(a)(1) was time-barred, and she and [they] lacked standing to bring the claim under section
12(a)(2)." Id.
73. Id. at 579.
74. Id. at 581.
75. 145 F. Supp. 2d 871, 873 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
76. Belizan, 434 F.3d at 581 (internal quotations omitted).
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Plaintiffs appealed, contesting, inter alia, the district court's deci-
sion to dismiss their complaint "with prejudice."" Plaintiffs argued that
"failure to satisfy these heightened pleading standards did not necessi-
tate the dismissal of the complaint with prejudice because the PSLRA
does not supercede the procedure for moving to amend a complaint
under Rule 15(a)."7 Plaintiffs referenced Eminence Capital to lend sup-
port to their argument, as in that case, the court explained that because
the PSLRA "requires a plaintiff to plead a complaint of securities fraud
with an unprecedented degree of specificity and detail," it is important
that the district court "consider the relevant factors and articulate why
dismissal should be with prejudice instead of without prejudice."7 Con-
versely, defendants cited Miller in response, contending that "the height-
ened pleading standards of the PSLRA logically limit the application of
Rule 15(a) and concomitantly imply dismissal with prejudice is indi-
cated in securities fraud cases that do not measure up to those
standards."so
The D.C. Circuit sided with the plaintiffs, "vacat[ing] the order of
dismissal and remand[ing] the case to the district court to enter a new
order either dismissing without prejudice or explaining its dismissal with
prejudice."" The court was quite confused with the original ruling,
believing it was clear that the complaint should not have been dismissed
with prejudice nor should the PSLRA have factored into its decision. 8 2
Dismissing with prejudice is fatal,8 and it thus logically follows that the
standard for it be set quite high.84 The court explained that although the
PSLRA provides that "[d]ismissal for failure to meet pleading require-
ments" is appropriate," the PSLRA does not say whether such dismissal
should be with or without prejudice. 6 If Congress wanted dismissals to
be with prejudice and for the PSLRA to restrict Rule 15(a), the text of
77. Id. at 582.
78. Id. at 583. Plaintiffs relied on United States v. Microsoft Corp., a previous decision
rendered by the D.C. Circuit that held under Rules Enabling Act, rules of civil procedure are
deemed to supercede conflicting statute except insofar as a substantive right is involved. See 165
F.3d 952, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
79. Belizan, 434 F.3d at 583 (citing 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003)).
80. Id. (citing 346 F.3d 660, 690-92 (6th Cir. 2003)).
81. Id. at 584.
82. See id. at 583 ("We are uncertain why the district court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice, and what role the PSLRA played in its thinking.").
83. Dismissal with prejudice "operates as a rejection of the plaintiffs claims on the merits
and [ultimately] precludes further litigation" of them. Id. (quoting Jaramillo v. Burkhart, 59 F.3d
78, 79 (8th Cir. 1995)).
84. Id.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (2012).
86. Belizan, 434 F.3d at 583.
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the PSLRA should have so provided.8 7 Because the PSLRA does not
provide any guidance on the issue, the court concluded that the issue
was governed solely by Rule 15(a).8 8 Finally, the court drew a compari-
son to the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) for allegations of
fraud, standards which do not alter the operation of Rule 15(a).89
iii. FIRST CIRCUIT: ACA FINANCIAL GUARANTY CORP. V.
ADVEST, INC.
The First Circuit followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit and D.C.
Circuit, becoming the third federal circuit court of appeal to hold that the
PSLRA in securities fraud cases did not alter the policy for liberal
amendment of pleadings under Rule 15(a).9 0 In ACA Financial, "bond
purchasers brought suit alleging violations of federal securities laws in
the May 1998 offering of bonds of Bradford College in Massachu-
setts."91 The college defaulted on its bond obligations, leading plaintiffs
to contend they were misled by the "Official Statement" attached to the
offering, which allegedly concealed Bradford's ominous financial posi-
tion and failure to pay the bond debt.9 2 The lower court dismissed the
amended complaint with prejudice for failure to meet the heightened
pleading standards of the PSLRA.93
Unlike the previous two discussed cases, the First Circuit used the
Supreme Court's decision in Tellabs as guidance.94 The court first cited
to Belizan, agreeing that "had the Congress wished to make dismissal
with prejudice the norm, and to that extent supercede the ordinary appli-
cation of Rule 15(a), we would expect the text of the PSLRA so to pro-
vide."95 Next, the court acknowledged that the Tellabs decision provided
an important lesson: "In the absence of a legislative directive to the con-
87. Id. at 584. Contributing to its opinion, the court referenced the Biomaterials Access
Assurance Act of 1998, which clearly states in its text Congress' intent for dismissals to be with
prejudice: "[A]n order granting a motion to dismiss" in a suit against a supplier to a manufacturer
of medical devices "shall be entered with prejudice." Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 1605(e) (1998)).
88. Id. The court observed that Rule 15(a) allows for "maximum opportunity for each claim
to be decided on its merits rather than on procedural technicalities." Id. (citing United States v.
Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
89. Id. (citing Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)).
90. ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2008).
91. Id. at 51. Plaintiffs, in their amended complaint, alleged violations of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the concomitant Rule lOb-5 for material omissions and
misrepresentations in the Official Statement. Id. at 54.
92. Id. at 51-52.
93. Id. at 51.
94. Id. at 52 ("This is our first occasion to apply the Supreme Court's recent guidance
regarding the standards for pleadings under the PSLRA in Tellabs .....
95. Id. at 56 (quoting 434 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
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trary, Rule 15 applies as in the normal course."9' The court continued:
"Interpreting the PSLRA as constricting the operation of Rule 15(a)
would be contrary to the purposes of the [PSLRA].""' The court reiter-
ated the twin goals of the PSLRA that were announced in Tellabs: "to
curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving investors' abil-
ity to recover on meritorious claims." 8 Consistent with the twin goals,
the court reasoned that the heightened pleading standard helps to achieve
"the goal of deterring frivolous litigation by erecting a significant hurdle
for a plaintiff to clear before her complaint can survive a motion to dis-
miss . . . [a] blanket rule that the PSLRA modifies Rule 15(a) would tip
the scales too far, undermining plaintiffs' ability to have meritorious
claims presented in court."99 Any reading to the contrary could possibly
"disturb the legislative balance struck by the [PSLRA]." 100 Although the
district court's decision was eventually affirmed, 01 the First Circuit
court held that PSLRA in securities fraud cases did not alter policy for
liberal amendment of pleadings. 102
iv. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: MIZZARO v. HOME DEPOT, INC.
The fourth and final federal circuit court of appeal to adopt the rule
that the PSLRA does not restrict the liberal amendment policy of Rule
15(a) was the Eleventh Circuit.os In Mizzaro, corporate retailer inves-
tors brought a securities fraud class action lawsuit against Home Depot,
Inc.' 0 Plaintiffs alleged that Home Depot, Inc. and its insiders
committed fraud in failing to disclose that corporate earnings had
been inflated as the alleged result of the retail stores' widespread
practice of falsely reporting products delivered to stores by suppliers
as defective in order to obtain unwarranted chargebacks for goods
that had been lost to shoplifters or that the store later sold, after
obtaining chargebacks, at zero cost.10 5
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and as that motion was pending,
plaintiffs moved for leave to amend if the district court granted the
96. Id. The Tellabs opinion dealt with applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard that all factual
allegations in a complaint must be accepted as true in the securities fraud context, but as the First
Circuit recognizes, it is helpful in understanding whether or not the PSLRA restricts the liberal
amendment policy of Rule 15. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
97. ACA Fin., 512 F.3d at 56.
98. Id. (quoting 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (internal quotations omitted)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Dismissal with prejudice was appropriate because plaintiffs had unduly delayed bringing
their second motion to amend. Id. at 46.
102. Id.
103. Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir. 2008).
104. Id. at 1230.
105. Id.
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motion to dismiss their complaint."o6 The district court granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss after concluding that the amended com-
plaint did not meet the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA. 0 7
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this specific part of the ruling. 0 8
Additionally, the district court held that "granting leave would be
futile because the additional facts presented in the motion for leave
would not change that result."" 9 Although plaintiffs did not submit a
proposed amended complaint, its motion for leave to amend cited three
newly discovered facts that allegedly strengthened the inference of sci-
enter."o The district court concluded that these additional facts would
not make any difference with regards to pleading scienter, "even when
viewed in concert with those alleged in the amended complaint."'" In
its final ruling, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court's deci-
sion.'2 But the decision was based on the additional facts that would
have been included in an amended complaint being futile in it surviving
the heightened pleading standards, rather than the PSLRA restricting the
liberal amendment policy of Rule 15(a)." 3 The Eleventh Circuit made
clear in its opinion that "[s]ince '[t]he text of the [PSLRA] neither pur-
ports to affect Rule 15(a), nor . . . require[s] that all dismissals be with
prejudice,' the normal Rule 15(a) standards apply here."" 4
IV. EXAMINATION OF COLE V. HARRIS
In Cole, the Sixth Circuit once again had an opportunity to decide a
case involving the tension between the PSLRA and Rule 15(a). Unfortu-
nately, the Sixth Circuit followed the ruling in Miller,"' and the
Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari."16
A. Factual Background
The plaintiffs in Cole brought a federal securities fraud action
106. Id. at 1235.
107. Id. The court stated that to survive a motion to dismiss under the PSLRA, the factual
allegations contained in a private securities fraud class action complaint must raise a "strong
inference," one that is "cogent and compelling," that the named defendants acted with the
requisite scienter. Id. The district court did not believe this standard was met, as "the amended
complaint had failed to adequately plead scienter." Id. at 1236.
108. Id. at 1235.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1255.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 1255-57.
114. Id. at 1255 (quoting ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir.
2008)).
115. See 444 F. App'x 888, 889 (6th Cir. 2012).
116. 133 S. Ct. 126 (2012).
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against various defendants.' 1 7 Plaintiffs were more than 200 individuals
and small businesses, almost all of whom were citizens of Canada.'"s
They alleged
that the three individual [diefendants, Kevin Harris, Keelan Harris,
and Karen Starr, used the two business-entity [d]efendants, Complete
Developments, LLC and a company known both as International
Investments, Inc. and as 13, LLC, based in Warren, Ohio, to conduct
a multi-million-dollar Ponzi scheme, pretending to use Plaintiffs'
investments to trade foreign currencies while actually using the funds
of newer investors to pay fake profits to earlier ones, and taking mil-
lions of dollars for themselves. 19
Plaintiffs claimed that over a period of time that spanned more than
a year, the defendants were able to acquire a total of $22 million from
plaintiffs by falsely representing to them that their money contributions
would be invested in a currency-trading program that was very low-risk
and would provide profits of more than five percent every month. 12 0
Plaintiffs further claimed that defendants' "representations were false
and made with actual knowledge of the falsity or with reckless disregard
to their truth in order to induce [p]laintiff and his assignors to invest
their monies with [d]efendants."' 2 1 Plaintiff alleged that defendants
acted in this deceiving fashion because they did not have a scheme or
plan that would pay plaintiffs with what they were originally prom-
ised. 12 2 These representations were material to plaintiffs in their assess-
ments to invest large amounts of money with defendants. 23 When
plaintiffs demanded the return of all of their money, the defendants
declined to comply with the request.124
B. Procedural History
This class action suit was brought in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio on June 3, 2009, by a singular
plaintiff acting for himself and other unnamed investors, pursuing total
damages of $22 million. 12 1
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and
failure to join indispensable parties, arguing that the singular plaintiff
"had not shown sufficient authorization to represent others and that the
117. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Cole, 133 S. Ct. 126 (2012) (No. 11-1334).
118. Id. at ii.
119. Id. at 2-3.
120. Cole, No. 4:09CV1270, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2689, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2010).
121. Id. at *5-6.
122. Id. at *6.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 117, at 3.
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failure to join all investors prejudiced defendants." 12 6 Defendants also
filed a "Notice" invoking their "Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-
Incrimination," and asserting "an objective and reasonable belief that
their submission to any civil discovery or testimony may subject them to
criminal prosecution."1 2 7 Judge Peter C. Economus denied defendants'
motion to dismiss, "ruling that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17(a)(3), plaintiff should be given time to join all real parties in inter-
est."1 2 8 Subsequently, the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge George
J. Limbert, as the parties stipulated to have him handle all facets of the
case. 12 9 On September 29, 2009, over 200 plaintiffs were listed in an
amended complaint filed by plaintiffs. 30 Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the amended complaint, for, inter alia, "failure to plead fraud
with the particularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and by provisions of the [PSLRA]."I 3 1
After a hearing, Magistrate Judge Limbert granted defendants'
motion to dismiss for failing to meet the requirements of Rule 9(b) and
the PSLRA. 1 3 2 Although the common-law fraud claim asserted by plain-
tiffs was dismissed without prejudice, the federal securities fraud claims
were dismissed with prejudice "upon a finding that that result was war-
ranted by the PSLRA." 1 3 3 Plaintiffs responded by filing motions for
reconsideration and summary judgment, supplementing and supporting
these motions with information received in expedited discovery.134
Defendants filed nothing in opposition to these motions, but plaintiffs'
motions were nonetheless denied. 3 '
Plaintiffs appealed'3 6 to the Sixth Circuit, but that court ultimately
affirmed the lower court's decision "for the reasons stated in the magis-
trate judge's Memorandum Opinion and Orders," stating, in addition,
126. Id.
127. Id. at 4.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. Defendant Keelan Harris, represented by new counsel, joined in that motion. Id.
132. Cole v. Harris, No. 4:09CV1270, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2689, at *21 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4,
2010).
133. See id. at *21-23.
134. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 117, at 5-6 (Plaintiffs "included hundreds of
pages of bank statements . . . showing the Ponzi scheme fraud.").
135. Id. at 6.
136. "While the appeal was pending, the federal government brought a civil case against, inter
alia, the same defendants, based on the fraud plaintiffs had alleged." Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 117, at 6 (citing U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Complete
Devs., LLC, 10-cv-2287 (N.D. Ohio filed Oct. 7, 2010)). Additionally, the federal government
brought a criminal case against Kevin Harris. Id. (citing United States v. Harris, 10-cr-0437 (N.D.
Ohio filed Oct. 7, 2010)). "Mr. Harris pleaded guilty to the fraud and was sentenced to serve more
than seven years in prison, and to pay restitution to, inter alia, the plaintiffs in this case." Id.
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that the relevant case law "support[s] the denial of the motion to
amend . .""' The Sixth Circuit denied plaintiffs' petition for rehearing
en banc. 3 8
Finally, plaintiffs filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on May 2,
2012.139 The question presented to the Supreme Court was:
Victims of securities fraud who sue the wrongdoers for damages in
federal court must file a complaint that meets the requirement of Rule
9(b) FRCP that the circumstances of the fraud be stated "with partic-
ularity" and additional requirements added by the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), including the require-
ment to plead facts "giving rise to a strong inference" of scienter. If a
complaint is dismissed for failing to meet these requirements, should
the dismissal be "with prejudice," despite the general provision of
Rule 15(a)(2) FRCP that courts should "freely give" leave to amend a
pleading "when justice so requires," on the grounds that to allow a
plaintiff to file an amended complaint with more detail would "frus-
trate the purpose" of the PSLRA?1 4 0
On October 1, 2012, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of
certiorari.141
C. Decision and Reasoning
The basis of the Sixth Circuit's decision was grounded in the rea-
soning set forth by Magistrate Judge Limbert in the district court.'4 2 In
its unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit court stated:
After carefully reviewing the record, the law, and the arguments on
appeal, we conclude that the court's orders correctly set out the appli-
cable law and correctly apply that law to the facts in the record. The
issuance of a full written opinion by this court would serve no useful
purpose. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the magistrate judge's
Memorandum Opinion and Orders, we affirm.14 3
The court in Cole failed to articulate any analysis whatsoever as to why
this was the proper ruling, besides relying on Magistrate Judge
Limbert's opinion.? Relying on prior Sixth Circuit case law, the court
stated "allowing repeated filing of amended complaints would frustrate
137. Cole v. Harris, 444 F. App'x 888, 889 (6th Cir. 2012).
138. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 117, at 6.
139. Id.
140. Id. at i.
141. Cole v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 126 (2012). After the denial, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division ruled on Plaintiffs' pending motion to reopen
the case. Cole v. Harris, No. 4:09CV1270, 2012 WL 5830524, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2012).
The court denied Plaintiffs' motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) and Rule 15(d). Id. at *6.
142. Cole, 444 F. App'x at 888-89.
143. Id. at 889.
144. Id.
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the purpose of the PSLRA."l4 5 The court went on to state that "[t]he
[district] court denied the plaintiffs an opportunity to further amend their
complaint because they had already argued-in response to both
motions to dismiss for lack of particularity-that the complaint was fine
as written and no amendment was necessary." 46 Interestingly enough,
this seems inaccurate, as the district court made no mention of dis-
missing the claim with prejudice because Plaintiffs believed complaint
to be "fine as written." 14 7
V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED CERTIORARI AND
REVERSED COLE v. HARRIS
By not granting certiorari in Cole, the Supreme Court missed an
opportunity to cure the existing tension between the PSLRA and Rule
15(a). Moreover, this Article argues that with that grant of certiorari, the
Supreme Court should have reversed Cole, finding that the PSLRA did
not intend to restrict or limit Rule 15(a) in any way. This rule would
make dismissals of securities fraud claims with prejudice based solely on
that they did not meet the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA
improper. A blanket rule similar to the one in Cole permitting automatic
dismissals with prejudice is inappropriate because it is inconsistent with:
(A) the text and legislative history of the PSLRA; (B) the important
principles embodied in Rule 15(a); (C) the Supreme Court's language in
Tellabs; and (D) one of the twin aims of the PSLRA: preserving inves-
tors' ability to recover on meritorious claims.
A. Text and Legislative History of the PSLRA
The existing rule in the Sixth Circuit is incorrect and the Supreme
Court should have granted certiorari in Cole, ultimately reversing the
decision because neither the text nor the legislative history of the
PSLRA supports a bright-line rule that all dismissals for not meeting the
heightened pleading standards should be with prejudice. Rule 15(a),
amendments, and dismissals with prejudice are not mentioned in the
PSLRA. The PSLRA discusses heightened pleading standards,14 8 but it
145. Id. at 888.
146. Id. at 888-89.
147. See Cole v. Harris, No. 4:09CV1270, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2689, at *21 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 4, 2010) ("This dismissal is based solely upon Plaintiffs' failure to meet the technical
pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) and 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)." (emphasis added)).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2012). The relevant provisions of the PSLRA on pleading state:
(b) Requirements for securities fraud actions
(1) Misleading statements and omissions
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff alleges
that the defendant-
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does not speak whatsoever about heightened pleading standards and
their effect on possible amendment after dismissal. It does, however,
mention dismissals for failing to meet the pleading requirements, stat-
ing: "In any private action arising under this chapter, the court shall, on
the motion of any defendant, dismiss the complaint if the requirements
of paragraphs (1) and (2) are not met."14 9 The text thus requires com-
plaints that do not meet the pleading requirements to be dismissed, but
does not require them to be with prejudice. If Congress wanted dismiss-
als to be with prejudice, it would have written it into the PSLRA. As the
D.C. Circuit stated in Belizan, "[H]ad the Congress wished to make dis-
missal with prejudice the norm, and to that extent supercede the ordinary
application of Rule 15(a), we would expect the text of the PSLRA so to
provide."150
Furthermore, nothing in the legislative history of the PSLRA
alludes to Rule 15(a), amendments, or dismissals with prejudice. Specif-
ically referencing the heightened pleading standards, Congress stated:
(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were
made, not misleading;
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and,
if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all
facts on which that belief is formed.
(2) Required state of mind
(A) In general
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), in any private action arising
under this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover money damages
only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind,
the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to
violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.
(B) Exception in the case of an action for money damages brought against
a credit rating agency or a controlling person under this chapter, it
shall be sufficient, for purposes of pleading any required state of mind
in relation to such action, that the complaint state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the credit rating agency
knowingly or recklessly failed-
(i) to conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated security with
respect to the factual elements relied upon by its own methodology
for evaluating credit risk; or
(ii) to obtain reasonable verification of such factual elements (which
verification may be based on a sampling technique that does not
amount to an audit) from other sources that the credit rating agency
considered to be competent and that were independent of the issuer
and underwriter.
149. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A).
150. 434 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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Naming a party in a civil suit for fraud is a serious matter.
Unwarranted fraud claims can lead to serious injury to reputation for
which our legal system effectively offers no redress. For this reason,
among others, Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that plaintiffs plead allegations of fraud with "particularity."
The Rule has not prevented abuse of the securities laws by private
litigants. Moreover, the courts of appeals have interpreted Rule 9(b)'s
requirement in conflicting ways, creating distinctly different stan-
dards among the circuits. The House and Senate hearings on securi-
ties litigation reform included testimony on the need to establish
uniform and more stringent pleading requirements to curtail the filing
of meritless lawsuits.
The Conference Committee language is based in part on the
pleading standard of the Second Circuit. The standard also is specifi-
cally written to conform the language to Rule 9(b)'s notion of plead-
ing with "particularity."
Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, the Second
Circuit requirement is that the plaintiff state facts with particularity,
and that these facts, in turn, must give rise to a "strong inference" of
the defendant's fraudulent intent. Because the Conference Committee
intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not
intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this plead-
ing standard. The plaintiff must also specifically plead with particu-
larity each statement alleged to have been misleading. The reason or
reasons why the statement is misleading must also be set forth in the
compliant in detail. If an allegation is made on information and
belief, the plaintiff must state with particularity all facts in the plain-
tiff's possession on which the belief is formed.15 1
It can be reasonably inferred that Congress had no intention of restrict-
ing Rule 15(a), but only altering the pleading standards of Rule 9(b).
Rule 9(b) is not the only Federal Rule of Civil Procedure mentioned in
the House Conference Report, as Rule 11 is mentioned repeatedly as
well. 1 52 In fact, Congress made it clear that it wanted Rule 11 applied
differently, it wanted to reduce the filing of meritless securities lawsuits
by "strengthening the application of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in private securities actions."' 5 Based on the above
examples of Rule 9(b) and Rule 11 in the PSLRA, in no way could
Congress have intended Rule 15(a) to be restricted. If it wished to alter
Rule 15(a), it would have done so just like it did with Rule 9(b) and
Rule 11.
151. H.R. Rar. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
740.
152. See id. at 738-40.
153. Id. at 738.
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B. Importance of Adhering to Rule 15(a)
Secondly, the existing rule in the Sixth Circuit is incorrect and Cole
should have been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court and reversed
because of the importance of adhering to Rule 15(a), for a variety of
reasons. These reasons include: (i) the liberal amendment policy embod-
ied in Rule 15(a); (ii) the consistency with which courts have applied
this liberal amendment policy in other instances of heightened pleading
standards; and (iii) the need to stay consistent with the Rules Enabling
Act.
i. LIBERAL AMENDMENT POLICY
As discussed above, Rule 15(a) is understood to employ a liberal
amendment policy. 154 Rule 15(a) "embodies the liberal pleading philos-
ophy of the federal rules.""' This liberal amendment philosophy limits
the district court's discretion to deny leave to amend.15 6 The liberal
amendment policy is well-known and understood:
Rule 15(a) complements the liberal pleading and joinder provi-
sions of the federal rules by establishing a time period during which
the pleadings may be amended automatically and by granting the
court broad discretion to allow amendments to be made to the plead-
ings after that period has expired. Rule 15(a) therefore reinforces one
of the basic policies of the federal rules-that pleadings are not an
end in themselves but are only a means to assist in the presentation of
a case to enable it to be decided on the merits. In order to further this
policy, the court, on its own initiative, may require the parties to
amend to avoid dismissal and subdivision (a)(2) provides that when a
party moves to amend the court "should freely give leave when jus-
tice so requires." Applying this flexible standard, one court has stated
that "when any defendant appears generally in an action, he is
deemed to have made an appearance with the knowledge that amend-
ments are granted liberally and will be allowed and freely given when
justice requires it.""'
In fact, the liberal amendment policy is consistent with the purpose of
the Federal Rules as a whole, which "[should be construed and adminis-
tered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.""' If Rule 15(a) were read any differently or
narrowly, it would go against one of the Federal Rules' overall purpose
of seeking and achieving justice.
154. See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
155. E.g., Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 1984).
156. Id.
157. WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 33, at § 1473.
158. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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ii. RULE 15(a) STILL APPLIES TO OTHER HEIGHTENED
PLEADING STANDARDS
Consistent with the liberal amendment policy, Rule 15(a) has not
been applied any differently in other instances that call for heightened
pleading standards. To illustrate, prior to the PSLRA, Rule 9(b) required
a heightened pleading standard for securities fraud litigation. Rule 9(b)
states: "In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowl-
edge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged gener-
ally."159 However, courts still applied the liberal standard of Rule 15(a)
when complaints were dismissed for not meeting the heightened plead-
ing standards of Rule 9(b).16 0 This is true even in the Sixth Circuit,
which held that leave to amend should be freely given pursuant to Rule
15(a) even though the complaint was dismissed for not meeting the
heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b). 16 '
By the same token, the application of Rule 15(a) has not changed
after the pleading standards required by Rule 8 were interpreted in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly'62 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.'6 3 These cases ana-
lyzed Rule 8's short and plain statement rule required for a complaint to
be sufficient and for the "pleader to be entitled to relief."' 64 The inter-
pretation was changed from the implication that a complaint should not
be dismissed unless the pleader could prove "no set of facts entitling him
to relief" 65 to complaints needing to "state a claim to relief that is plau-
sible on its face."' 6 6 Many scholars have reasoned that this change
resulted in heightened pleading standards.167 Even with this change in
pleading standards, most courts have held that Rule 15(a)'s liberal
amendment policy applies unchanged. 1 68 Thus, even when normal
pleading standards are heightened, in no context has Rule 15(a) been
159. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
160. See Belizan v. Hershon, 434 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Bly-Magee v.
California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)).
161. See United States v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 644 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Given
that 'federal courts must be liberal in allowing parties to amend their complaints,' we will remand
the case to the district court to allow Relator to comply with Rule 9(b) by amending his amended
complaint.").
162. 550 U.S. 34 (2007).
163. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
165. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
166. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
167. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss
Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 15 (2010).
168. See, e.g., HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir. 2012)
(acknowledging that leave to amend is "freely given when justice so requires" after Iqbal).
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applied differently because of it. Why would heightened pleading stan-
dards under the PSLRA be any different?
iii. RULE 15(a) IN No WAY HAS BEEN PROPERLY ALTERED
Nowhere in the PSLRA is Rule 15(a) or denying leaves to amend
mentioned, leaving Rule 15(a) unaltered. Without Congress expressly
changing Rule 15(a), courts need to be cautious not to overstep the
boundaries and limits of proper judicial authority. The Supreme Court
has stated that "questions regarding pleading, discovery, and summary
judgment are most frequently and most effectively resolved either by the
rulemaking process or the legislative process."1 6 9
Britton is a prime example of a court overstepping its judicial
authority in trying to alter the application of a specific Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure. There, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
D.C. Circuit, holding that the D.C. Circuit "erred in fashioning a height-
ened burden of proof for unconstitutional-motive cases against public
officials."o In its reasoning, the Supreme Court stated that "[n]either
the text of § 1983 or any other federal statute, nor the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, provide any support for imposing the clear and con-
vincing burden of proof on plaintiffs either at the summary judgment
stage or in the trial itself.""' Congress had already spoken on the issue
by instituting the Prison Litigation Reform Act in April 1996,172 which
left out any change in pleading standards."' The Supreme Court
inferred that Congress did not intend to alter the rules in this way
because Congress did not directly advocate or require this change:
Most significantly, the statute draws no distinction between constitu-
tional claims that require proof of an improper motive and those that
do not. If there is a compelling need to frame new rules of law based
on such a distinction, presumably Congress either would have dealt
with the problem in the Reform Act, or will respond to it in future
legislation.' 74
Interestingly enough, this was not the first time that the Supreme Court
169. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrot Cuty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993)).
170. Id. at 574. (That court adopted a clear and convincing evidence requirement to deal with a
potentially serious problem: because an official's state of mind is easy to allege and hard to
disprove, insubstantial claims turning on improper intent may be less amenable to summary
disposition than other types of claims against government officials. The standard was intended to
protect public servants from the burdens of trial and discovery that may impair the performance of
their official duties.).
171. Id. at 594.
172. Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321.
173. See Britton, 523 U.S. at 596-97.
174. Id. at 597.
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declined similar invitations to revise established rules.1 7 ' Therefore, this
precedent unequivocally establishes the proper avenues that need to be
taken in order to alter a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. A court over-
stepping its judicial limits in its statutory interpretation of a piece of
congressional legislation is not a permissive avenue. This is exactly
what was done by the Sixth Circuit in Miller and reaffirmed in Cole.
iv. CONSISTENCY WITH THE RULES ENABLING ACT
The Rules Enabling Act17 1 is a uniform federal bill authorizing the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedures at civil actions of
law.177 The Rules Enabling Act in its entirety reads:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate
judges thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force
or effect after such rules have taken effect.
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for
the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.17 1
Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, when a Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure and another statute conflict, the statute is deemed superseded,
unless such supersession would "abridge, enlarge, or modify [a] substan-
tive right."17 9 Thus, even if the Sixth Circuit is correct in ruling that the
PSLRA restricts Rule 15(a) in some way, the Rules Enabling Act
requires that Rule 15(a) supersede the PSLRA.
C. Inconsistency with Tellabs
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Tellabs is yet another reason
why the existing rule in the Sixth Circuit is incorrect, thus the Supreme
Court should have granted certiorari in Cole and reversed. In Tellabs,
the Supreme Court also recognized the PSLRA's twin goals: (1) "curb
frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation," (2) "while preserving investors'
ability to recover on meritorious claims.""s The First Circuit in ACA
175. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317-18 (1995); Leatherman v. Tarrot Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164-69 (1993); Gomez v. Toledo, 446
U.S. 635, 639-40 (1980).
176. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
177. Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1024
(1982).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
179. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 165 F.3d 952, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Henderson v.
United States, 517 U.S. 654, 663 (1996)).
180. See 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007).
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Financial used Tellabs as support for its holding that the PSLRA did not
restrict the liberal amendment policy embodied in Rule 15(a).' 8 1 One of
the lessons of Tellabs, highlighted by the First Circuit in ACA Financial,
is that "in the absence of a legislative directive to the contrary, the [Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure] appl[y] as in the normal course."18 2 As
discussed previously, the text and the legislative history of the PSLRA
makes no mention of Rule 15(a),18 1 making it, according to the lesson of
Tellabs, apply in its normal course.
Critics of this view will argue that the holding in Cole is consistent
with Tellabs, alluding to the twin goals of the PSLRA and how repeated
amendments may prove contrary to these twin goals. Certain jurisdic-
tions have already made a parallel between the goals of the PSLRA and
a blanket rule on denying amendment, such as in Miller, where the Sixth
Circuit court stated: "[T]he purpose of the PSLRA would be frustrated if
district courts were required to allow repeated amendments to com-
plaints filed under the PSLRA."' 84 But not only is deterring frivolous
lawsuits a goal of the PSLRA, so too is the salvaging of meritorious
claims.' 8 5 "A blanket rule that the PSLRA modifies Rule 15(a) would tip
the scales too far, compromising plaintiffs' ability to have meritorious
claims presented in court."1 86 "To read the PSLRA to constrict Rule
15(a) would distort and corrupt the legislative balance struck by the
Act.""' So although there may be a minor argument that critics can
assert, in no way is it strong enough to merit such a catastrophic rule.
D. The Salvaging of Possible Meritorious Claims
The language in Tellabs parallels the most important point as to
why the existing rule in the Sixth Circuit is incorrect and Cole should
have been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court and reversed: the
need for a clear and consistent rule to help salvage meritorious claims.
The PSLRA requires "an unprecedented degree of specificity and
detail."18 8 The difficulty the PSLRA presents plaintiffs and their lawyers
makes it very easy to make a mistake in pleading a proper securities
fraud complaint.' 8 This was not the intention of Congress when it
181. See supra Part III.B.iii.
182. 512 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir. 2008).
183. See supra Part V.A.
184. 346 F.3d 660, 692 (6th Cir. 2003).
185. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 320.
186. ACA Fin., 512 F.3d at 56.
187. Id.
188. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam).
189. See generally, Hon. H. Brent Knight, Pleading Fraud Under the PSLRA, 11 PRAC. LrrlG.
45, 55 (2000). Judge Knight concluded
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enacted the PSLRA, as it wished to "establish uniform and more strin-
gent pleading requirements to curtail the filing of meritless lawsuits."l 9 0
However, this has been the unquestioned result. Because of Congress's
uncertainty and vagueness as to what the established standard would be,
the pleading standards of the PSLRA are as far from "uniform" as they
were when Rule 9(b) was the standard for pleading fraud.' 9 ' With these
difficult pleading standards to meet and the inconsistency in which it is
interpreted by the courts, it is not out of the realm of possibility that
many meritorious claims may be dismissed because they fail to meet
these standards. This is not because they are frivolous strike suits;19 2
they are actually meritorious claims, with actual aggrieved plaintiffs,
whose complaint failed to meet the heightened pleading standards for
some other reason (high degree of detail not met, confusing interpreta-
tions, et cetera). "The liberal amendment policy serves the second aim of
the PSLRA by preventing merited claims from being dismissed because
of hyper-technical rules of pleading." 193
Likewise, there needs to be protection in place to save possible
meritorious claims, not just because of the technical and difficult plead-
ing requirements of the PSLRA, but also because of the abundance of
fraud present in general, and plaintiffs' need to be protected. Studies
conducted on the PSLRA and its effects after its first ten years in exis-
tence are enlightening. 94 Studies have shown that settlements after the
enactment of the PSLRA include a higher percentage of meritorious liti-
gation, while at the same time, the filing of lawsuits is increasing.1 95
One scholar suggested that more fraud is occurring since the enactment
of the PSLRA than that which occurred previously.196
With this possible increase in fraud, occurring while meritorious
As with scienter, so with particularity: The law is in flux. A uniform standard is
wanted by many, but delivered as yet by none. Until the Supreme Court weighs in
on these issues, counsel should be aware of the differences, even within the circuits
themselves, of the decisions interpreting the PSLRA and proceed with care. Counsel
should also be mindful of the legislative history and the role it could play in
developing consensus.
Id.
190. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
740.
191. James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, & Lynn Bai, Do Differences in Pleading Standards
Cause Forum Shopping in Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analysis, 2009
Wis. L. REV. 421, 430-32 (2009).
192. Frivolous strike suits are one of the reasons Congress enacted the PSLRA and raised the
pleading standards for securities fraud cases. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
193. See Wunderlich, supra note 17, at 368.
194. See generally Choi & Thompson, supra note 12 (surveying the empirical evidence on the
impact of the PSLRA).
195. See id. at 1500.
196. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL.
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litigation is litigated and settled, one arrives at the indisputable conclu-
sion that there is no need to have a bright-line and blanket rule that
dismisses all complaints with prejudice that do not meet the heightened
pleading requirements of the PSLRA. Let the plight of the potential vic-
tims and plaintiffs in the securities fraud context not be forgotten. Con-
gress itself has stated,
Private securities litigation is an indispensable tool with which
defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely
upon government action. Such private lawsuits promote public and
global confidence in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdo-
ing and to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, law-
yers and others properly perform their jobs. This legislation seeks to
return the securities litigation system to that high standard.' 97
The possibility that meritorious claims are being dismissed because of
such a rule is not consistent with any form of justice, let alone justice in
the securities fraud context, as evidenced above.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the arena of complex securities fraud litigation, plaintiffs deserve
more than just one bite at the apple with regards to the filing of a com-
plaint. This is not to say that plaintiffs should be afforded an unlimited
amount of bites at the apple. Traditional federal amendment rules should
apply, incorporating the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15(a) that is
both consistent with the federal rules and the pleading regime in general.
If Congress intended the PSLRA to have required dismissals to always
be with prejudice, it would have implemented this per se poisonous
apple itself in the text of the PSLRA or made it clear in the lead-up to its
passing.
The Supreme Court missed a crucial opportunity to cure a grave
injustice by not granting certiorari and reversing the decision in Cole.
The Sixth Circuit's blanket rule is too extreme and devastating to plain-
tiffs, who risk dismissal with prejudice of their possibly meritorious
claims for failing to meet the heightened pleading standards required by
the PSLRA.19 8 This holding goes completely against any textual or stat-
utory interpretation of the PSLRA, as well as any inquiry into the
PSLRA's legislative history. A core tension has been created with Rule
15(a), as the rule in Cole constrains the liberal thrust that reigns in Rule
15(a)'s interpretation and application throughout history. Hope is not out
L. REv. 913 (2003) (presenting an empirical analysis that suggests that there has been an increase
in class action filings).
197. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
198. See Cole v. Harris, 444 F. App'x 888, 889 (6th Cir. 2012).
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of the question, as in 2007, the Supreme Court in Tellabs decided a case
dealing with a circuit split on a specific interpretation of the PSLRA. 199
Seeing as only five federal circuits have ruled on the issue at hand, more
litigation involving securities fraud suits that are dismissed for not meet-
ing the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA are sure to come.
But, for now, securities fraud plaintiffs must be wary of the poisonous
apple that is alive and well in certain jurisdictions in this country; one
bite from the poisonous apple is likely fatal to the plaintiffs' claim, with
no kiss from the Prince in sight.
199. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
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